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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Saudi Arabia is attempting to transition its economy from a rentier economy
to a diverse private industry. The Saudi Arabian labor market has long depended
on oil to fund high-paying government positions for many citizens. Despite the war
in Ukraine reinvigorating demand for Saudi oil, prior projections suggesting that
oil is no longer a dependable source of revenue remain relevant. The emergence of
a strong and self-sustaining private sector is needed to ensure the stability of Saudi
Arabia and the surrounding region. Vision 2030 is Prince Mohammad Bin Salman’s
master plan for developing a sustainable Saudi private industry. A variety of factors
complicate and delay this transition, many of which have religious undergirds that
are not easily malleable. Saudi Arabia has recently established a rule of law that
mitigates Islam’s influence on financial institutions. This is, of course, not without
expressions of skepticism from religious voices throughout Islam.
The U.S. should desire to be involved in the success of Vision 2030. There
is an opportunity for the U.S. to capitalize on economic ventures, achieve
geopolitical interests, and address humanitarian concerns. The United States’ longstanding trade relationship with Saudi Arabia in the military and defense industry
directly benefits middle-class America.1 What other industries in a developed Saudi
private economy could benefit Americans? Saudi Arabia influences the entire
region and would be further equipped to ensure a more stable Middle East with a
thriving private industry. The United States’ shrinking military presence in the
region requires other tools to be use. If the United States secures its stake in the
Saudi market, it also secures influence and partnership in the entire region—
leverage that would otherwise go to China or other adversaries. Whatever country
is most invested in the emerging economy will have the most leverage and influence
in the region. There is also an opportunity for accountability. Tethering U.S. private
businesses to Saudi industry can also elevate Saudi Arabia’s human rights standards
to align with U.S. values. The best policy is one that grows the Saudi private
industry and grasps the most significant portion of the Saudi private sector.
Optically, the status quo appears to be the best option. The factors which
determine the success of Vision 2030 do not exist in a vacuum. The status quo does
not further upset the religious authority in Saudi Arabia. Explicitly endorsing and
coercing the drastic legal revisions spurred on by Vision 2030 is needless and could
provide ammunition for the religious critiques of the overhaul. Saudi Arabia must
find a unique way to transition while avoiding the “Westernization” of the country.
U.S. policy should also aim to prevent any escalation that could lead to violence or
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the spread of extremist ideology. Authentic Islamic approval, not the Senior
Council of Scholars changing their rulings to keep up with political pressures, is
needed for the transition to be solid and stable.
Saudi Arabia has proven how determined they are to foster an environment
conducive to a thriving private industry. The Saudi government does not need any
outside incentives to continue to make the necessary institutional reforms to
stimulate private investment. Public pressure is unnecessary. Identifying what other
improvements could be made to encourage private investment in Saudi Arabia
would be beneficial if done in a manner that is not noticeable to the public eye. It
should appear as though all reformation is the original idea of Saudi Arabia, not the
United States or other Western powers. U.S. diplomats must be careful not to
overstep this fine line.

BACKGROUND
Saudi Arabia the Petrostate
Saudi Arabia’s state-owned oil accounts for roughly 87% of budget
revenue, 42% of GDP, and 90% of export earnings.2 The oil prices that enabled
such economic success will not last forever and have already begun dissipating.
The IMF reported that oil revenues in the region dropped from over $1 trillion in
2012 to $575 billion in 2019.3 The expansion of the private sector could not come
any sooner for Saudi Arabia. Riyadh is facing a budget deficit. To counter this,
Riyadh raised taxes, much to the public’s disliking.4 Oil prices can no longer be a
reliable source of income for the Saudi government. The Economist writes, “In an
attempt to balance the books, Saudi Arabia has suspended a cost-of-living
allowance for state workers, raised petrol prices, and tripled its sales tax. Even so,
the budget deficit could exceed $110bn this year (16% of GDP).”5 The monarchy
can no longer depend on its oil reserves to “buy loyalty with do-nothing publicsector jobs and free services” as it has in the past.6 Private revenue is desperately
needed but not readily available.
The structure of the Saudi labor market is a hinderance. Dr. Hanaa Almoaibed,
Research Fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies,
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estimates that 66% of the Saudi workforce is employed directly by the government.7
The average public sector wage is 58% higher than the average private-sector
wage.8 At one point, there were 800,000 Saudis awaiting government jobs.9 Oil
dependency allowed for an abundance of secure and well-paying government jobs
for Saudis. This is no longer the case. The oil-enabled enormity of the government
sector has burdened the private sector. The large public sector provided comfort
and wealth for two-thirds of the working population. The oil revenue is no longer
flowing in to accommodate the bloated government. The much-needed growth of
the private sector is now inhibited. The government has traditionally been the
source of well-paying, desirable employment opportunities, while the Saudi private
market has been small and predominantly made up of foreigners. The lack of
diversification in the private labor market is the negative externality of a historically
booming oil industry.
The common political characteristics among rentier states provide insight into
the political context of Saudi Arabia.10 The ruler of the rentier state controls the
production and sales of natural resources.11 The ruler maintains political power by
employing citizens and distributing revenue from sales to the general population.12
The population then uses this income as a significant source of their consumption
power. Circumstance has tasked the Saudi Arabian government with finding a way
to maintain political power without the monetary power from oil the regime has
historically depended upon. Petrostates, like Saudi Arabia, are susceptible to what
economists call Dutch Disease: “a dynamic in which a government develops an
unhealthy dependence on natural resource exports, and other important industrial
sectors are deprived of investment.”13 Characteristics of petrostates ridden with
Dutch Disease include:
a) “government income is deeply reliant on the export of oil and natural gas,
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b) economic and political power are highly concentrated in an elite minority,
and
c) political institutions are weak and unaccountable, and corruption is
widespread.”14
Saudi Arabia is a prime example of a petrostate with Dutch Disease. GDP,
exports, government revenue, and the employment of a large majority of Saudi
citizens all heavily depend on oil. Categorizing Saudi Arabia as a petrostate with
Dutch Disease is important when considering the threats looming if the transition
of the Saudi economy is not achieved. For example, Venezuela, a fellow member
of OPEC, is a prime example of a failed petrostate. Venezuela’s oil dependence led
to a spiraling economy, hyperinflation, a growing autocracy, and a giant
humanitarian crisis.15 Economic development expert Jeffrey Sachs advises
countries like Saudi Arabia “to finance outlays on public goods that serve as the
platform for private investment and long-term growth” to avoid the same fate as
Venezuela.16 Saudi Arabia has broadly taken heed of this advice in its self-interest,
but there are still areas of friction.
Regulatory Environment
Neglect of the private sector is evident in the prior absence of laws that
would encourage economic development. Hassam Fallatah argues that a proper
legal environment is crucial for entrepreneurship and economic development in
Saudi Arabia.17 He writes, “Legal environment is a key factor in business success
and in attracting foreign investment.”18 The government of Saudi Arabia failed to
provide such an environment. There was no single location for accessing the laws
on starting a business. Instead, there were multiple codes of law, and it was
impossible to decipher precisely which rule of law would be applied in a particular
scenario.19 This ecosystem lacked the stability and predictability that comes from a
single rule of law equally applied to all.
The World Bank measures eleven factors that influence an economy’s
capability for conducting business. The World Bank scores each category from 0Cheatham and Labrador, “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate.”
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100 and ranks the country’s competency in that category compared to the other 190
different economies that data is collected for. Until recently, Saudi Arabia’s score
for resolving insolvency was a 0 out of 100.20 Insolvency laws in the United States
and the United Kingdom “help to balance the effects of business failure, and
encourage the entry of new entrepreneurs into the economy.”21 There was
previously no practice of resolving insolvencies in Saudi Arabia. Borrowing money
to open a business is a daunting task in a highly functioning economic environment.
Adding the uncertainty of what may happen if the company fails would surely
discourage one’s entrance into the private sector.
The Saudi government seems to have heard the laments of the private
industry and answered with a swath of policy initiatives. The regulatory
environment has improved drastically since the rollout of Vision 2030. Bankruptcy
law went into effect in August 2018.22 Competition law was improved and went
into effect in September 2019.23 The government approved a public procurement
law “which establishes a more centralized process that should increase efficiency
and fairness in the awarding of government contracts and boost the participation.”24
Altering such laws to streamline actions needed for business was a momentous
change to the system. Multiple firms that measure investment climates agree:
The country jumped 13 places on the IMD World
Competitiveness Yearbook 2019, the biggest gain of any
country surveyed, and increased two more spots in 2020 to 24th
place, supported by improvements to government and business
efficiency. The World Bank ranked Saudi Arabia the world’s
top reformer and improver in its Doing Business 2020 report.
The Kingdom rose 30 places, from 92nd to 62nd, and improved
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in 9 out of 10 areas measured in the report. World Economic
Forum’s 2020 Global Competitiveness Report Special Edition
ranked Saudi Arabia among the top 10 countries in the world
for digital skills.25

Furthermore, two government authorities were elevated to ministries in
2020 with the establishment of the Ministry of Investment and the Ministry of
Tourism.26 The Shareek Program, announced in March of 2021, aims to generate
$3.2 trillion of domestic investment from the sovereign wealth investment fund and
the private sector. Despite the efforts made towards protecting intellectual property
rights (IPR) by establishing the Saudi Authority for Intellectual Property, the U.S.
State Department notes that “the continued lack of effective protection of IPR in
the pharmaceutical sector remains a significant concern.”27 There is still room for
improvement, but the country is being recognized for its huge leaps towards making
the private industry more attractive.
The U.S. Department of State’s Executive Summary of the 2021 Investment
Climate of Saudi Arabia diagnoses investors’ hesitancy to be rooted in concerns
over the rule of law, business predictability, and political risk.28 Saudi Arabia will
not see as much private investment as possible due to the problem of uncertainty.
Saudi Arabia should seek to minimize risks to encourage private investment and
bring businesses to Saudi Arabia. Granted, much of the unpredictability cannot be
managed quickly as the sources of the uncertainty are somewhat complicated. For
example, the U.S. government has proven ineffective at ending Saudi Arabia’s war
with the Houthi rebels in Yemen. In President Biden’s first speech on foreign affairs
since taking office, he promised to end the war in Yemen.29 A paper by the
Brookings Institution argues that the war in Yemen parallels the war in Afghanistan
in that the Houthis also have legitimate reasons to continue fighting a foreign force
even if they lack domestic support.30 The paper states, “Although the Americans
and the Saudis possess superior military equipment and vastly greater resources,
eventually they will leave; in contrast, the Taliban and the Houthis are in their home
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country and have no option but to continue fighting.”31 The domestic turbulence
this conflict causes in Saudi Arabia, like the recent drone attack on an oil site, seems
to be largely outside of the influence of the U.S. and appears to be a non-negotiable
topic for Saudi Arabia.
A more manageable government failure causing uncertainty for investors is
the lack of transparency and consistency found in regulatory agencies. The Ministry
of Investment of Saudi Arabia (MISA) is tasked with governing and regulating
foreign investment in the country. The U.S. State Department noted the following
flaw with the regulatory agency:
An important MISA objective is to ensure that investors do not
just acquire and hold licenses without investing, and MISA
sometimes cancels licenses of foreign investors that it deems do
not contribute sufficiently to the local economy. MISA’s
periodic license reviews, with the possibility of cancellation,
add uncertainty for investors and can provide a disincentive to
longer-term investment commitments.32

The United States has a similar agency under the Department of the
Treasury called the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS). The agency has the role of ensuring that no transactions are related to
national security threats. However, the distinction between CFIUS and MISA is
that CFISU is consistent and speedy in their rulings. A frustration of foreign
investors in Saudi Arabia is that it is difficult to predict if, and when, MISA may
rule that their investment license will be terminated.
Islam and the Saudi Government
Vision 2030 simultaneously aims to unleash the Saudi private economy
while shedding the country’s Wahhabi ideology.33 The country’s religious doctrine
is no longer abiding by any specific school of thought or exclusively to the
teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.34 Prince Mohammad Bin Salman has
Sheline and Riedel. “Biden's Broken Promise on Yemen.”
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33
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ended all Saudi-sponsored Islamism and overhauled much of the economic
inefficiencies the government was responsible for. Establishing new codes of law
has been, perhaps, most instrumental.
It cannot be overemphasized how large of a feat it is for Saudi Arabia’s legal
system to begin drifting away from Islamic law. Timur Kuran proposes that the
economic institutions resulting from Islam’s Holy Law constrained the Middle East
economically. In his book The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the
Middle East, Kuran argues, “The Middle East fell behind the West because it was
late in adopting key institutions of the modern economy.”35 Kuran examines the
technicalities of medieval Islamic financial institutions to show how they
contributed to the region’s loss of economic superiority. The entire region has deep
roots in Islam which shaping financial systems. Breaking this mold would have
been unthinkable 20 years ago.
Saudi Arabia has traditionally had an overlap between religious and state
entities.36 For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes how
more Islamic judicial authorities are in Saudi Arabia compared to other countries
in the region:
The courts of general jurisdiction were staffed with judges
trained primarily in Islamic sharia with no recourse to state law
codes. (By contrast, while judges in Syria or Morocco might
have taken a course on Islamic law in law school, the bulk of
their training would have been in state-legislated law codes.) In
the kingdom, public order was maintained not only by the
regular police but also by the Committee for Promoting Virtue
and Preventing Vice, generally termed the religious police in
English.37

Recently, Saudi Arabia has been moving authority away from religious authority
through consolidation. The Saudi government has kept ultraconservative figures in
power while forcing them to reverse previous rulings. Certain factions complain
how the religious authorities bend to the will of the political authorities. This flipflopping of opinion to please the political agenda damages credibility and could
lead to unrest. The country’s primary governmental religious establishment, The
Ministry of Islamic Affairs, has experienced restructuring from the top-down.
Clerics value their esteemed positions in government, so they abide closely to the
political will of the monarchy. Judges seated in Saudi courts are primarily educated
35
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in Islam, but an increasing amount of legislation is found not in Islamic doctrine,
but in state-centered legal texts. Furthermore, there has been an increased oversight
of Royal authority over politically charged cases, especially those regarding
women’s rights. The religious authorities are critiqued as merely doing the bidding
of the political authority. Religious scholars in Saudi Arabia wield a massive
amount of cultural control with their tens of millions of Twitter followers.
There is concern over the cost of this restructuring in the long run. First,
Saudi Arabia is risking the loss of soft power in the Islamic world. 38 Social
conservative Muslims across the globe and in Saudi Arabia may challenge Prince
Mohammad Bin Salman’s motivation and authority for the drastic reformation
taking place. Second, Prince Mohammad Bin Salman’s economic and social
liberalization are being accomplished through the authoritarian concentration of
power. For example, Prince Mohammad Bin Salman convinced his father to strip
the mutawa, religious police, of their ability to arrest.39 The issuing of religious
edicts, a standard tool used to criticize the social reforms taking place, has been
taken over by the government.40 All the changes that make Saudi Arabia an exciting
prospect economically come with the concern that the government will continue
down a path of silencing dissidents. Middle East Fellow of the Wilson Center,
David Brown, concluded a paper by saying, “Saudis are well aware that the most
serious challenges to the ruling House of Saud have historically come from
Wahhabi zealots and activists such as those who seized control of the Grand
Mosque in 1979 and led the Sahwa movement in the mid-1990s. Given this history,
another Wahhabi rebellion against the icon-smashing crown prince can hardly be
ruled out.”41The U.S. government should be hesitant to further any policy used as
a catalyst for an uprising or revolt. The Congressional Research Service notes,
“Laws criminalizing criticism of leaders and state policies remain in effect, as do
national security laws targeting broadly defined involvement with terrorism and
sedition.”42 The internal tension in Saudi Arabia causes difficulty in creating a
balanced approach to how the U.S. should interact with the nation.

Policy Goals
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The primary goal is to make Saudi Arabia a more stable, predictable, and
desirable economic environment. There are likely to be regional consequences of
the success or failure of Saudi Arabia’s economic transition. The last thing the
Middle East needs is for Saudi Arabia to fall into the economic traps common for
petrostates. Though what happened to Venezuela was tragic, it was not felt
throughout Latin America to the same degree a failed Saudi Arabia would be. The
primary focus in accomplishing this goal is to improve the investment climate for
Saudi Arabia.
The United States must balance accountability for human rights while
pursuing economic aims. After the CIA concluded that Washington Post columnist,
Jamal Khashoggi, was killed at the direct order of Prince Mohammed bin Salman,
Biden said during a Democratic debate, “We were going to in fact make them pay
the price, and make them, in fact, the pariah that they are.”43 Holding Saudi Arabia
accountable for egregious human rights violations is in the expressed interest of
President Joe Biden. However, public condemnation should be minimized for
relations to improve as evidenced by Prince Mohammed bin Salman declining a
phone call from a disadvantaged President Biden attempting to contain oil prices.44
Other goals concern minimizing tradeoffs that would undermine any
economic accomplishments: Wahabi discontent, civil unrest, and the rise of
authoritarianism. Much of the economic liberalization that has taken place is at the
expense of the Royal Family’s consolidation of power.
Fostering the
modernization of the Saudi economy will do no good if religious uprisings seek to
delegitimize the changes in law or the crown prince. It would be advantageous for
the United States, and the Middle East, if the Saudi economy transitioned
successfully and minimized religious backlash to the transition mechanisms.
Lastly, it is not preferred to allow the monarchy to consolidate so much power that
it becomes an even greater oppressive force.

Recommendation
Executive and Congressional actions are feasible but should not be pursued.
The government could leverage military support programs and enforce
repercussions for violations through typical diplomatic channels but such action
would needlessly damage the relationship. The desired results can be had without
sweeping government action. The U.S. should rely on the discretion of its private
Emily DeCiccio, “Biden Isn't Going to Make Saudis a 'Pariah' despite Khashoggi, Says Foreign
Policy Expert,” CNBC, February 26, 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/25/biden-isnt-goingto-make-saudis-a-pariah-despite-khashoggi-says-foreign-policy-expert.html.
44
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with Biden during Ukraine Crisis.” The Wall Street Journal, March 9, 2022.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-emirati-leaders-decline-calls-with-biden-during-ukraine-crisis11646779430.
43

sector in curtailing Saudi Arabia’s abuse of powers. For example, CEOs and other
leaders from JP Morgan Chase, HSBC, Blackstone, and Uber pulled out of an
investment conference that was highly anticipated for the Saudi government.45
American companies understand that they have American consumers they are
beholden to.
Dennis Ross and Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy aptly state, “The goal is to find the sweet spot that signals U.S. seriousness,
including the willingness to impose costs on objectionable behavior, without taking
steps that will be interpreted as an effort to humiliate the Saudi leadership.”46
Therefore, maintaining the status quo, or at least the appearance of the status quo,
is the best course of action. The U.S. should not seek any fundamental changes to
its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Increased oil prices caused by the Russian
invasion of Ukraine will boost revenue for the kingdom only temporarily. The U.S.
should withhold from making any rushed decisions. The transformations in Saudi
law transpired without outside pressure and will continue to do so.
The diversification of the Saudi economy has and will continue to upset
religious voices and cause internal tension. Since oil was discovered in Saudi
Arabia in 1932, the religious authority in Saudi Arabia, the ulema, have been
dependent on government funding for their existence; meanwhile, those in the
ruling class are mutually dependent on religious approval for political legitimacy.47
Saudi leadership must maintain religious approval while modernizing and
liberalizing. U.S. meddling or public shaming would be counterproductive. If the
US were to bring attention to the Saudi authoritarian tendencies, it would only serve
to legitimize accusations that the US is trying to separate Islam and the Saudi
economy.
The U.S. should quietly encourage Saudi Arabia to continue to liberate and
reform economic law to make its regulatory agencies more predictable and
transparent. Undetectable lobbying should be pursued. There should be no official
action in order to avoid accusations of “westernizing” Saudi Arabia. Such
accusations would expedite internal strife and could also damage the much-needed
religious tourist industry. Private discussions among U.S. business leaders,
diplomatic representatives, and other government officials would be better
received. Authentic Islamic approval should not be overlooked. Allowing the Saudi
“Reasons for Firms to Steer Clear of Saudi Arabia.” The Economist Newspaper, October 18,
2018. https://www.economist.com/business/2018/10/18/reasons-for-firms-to-steer-clear-of-saudiarabia.
46
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Near East Policy, February 22, 2021. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policyanalysis/defining-mature-balanced-relationship-saudi-arabia-urgent-task-biden-administration.
47
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Economy of Oil States.” Comparative Politics, no. 3, (1999): 299.
45

government’s self-interest in U.S. private investment to manage their behavior is
the best course of action.
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